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ABSTRACT 
 
In its efforts to integrate newly entering migrants into their societies, Europe has 
established integration policies that negatively impact these migrants, especially those 
from racialized backgrounds. The policies mask an agenda of securitization against 
outsiders who are falsely considered to be a danger to national security and national 
identity. Since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in the United States, many 
Western countries, including European countries, began to build a culture of fear 
against Muslims. Europe began to increasingly associate migrants with problems such 
as trafficking, radicalization, and terrorism. As a result, Europe began to treat migration 
as a security issue and migrants as the targets of the security policies. Governments 
established integration policies and citizenship laws so difficult that migrants began to 
find it harder to integrate, contributing to a genuine feeling of exclusion from society. 
Additionally, security forces were given the responsibility of vetting migrants and 
determining who could enter European states and who could not. Slowly, Muslim 
migrants came to be associated with criminality and danger. European governments 
allowed security forces to monitor Muslim migrants, fearing their radicalization, and 
allowed raids to take place against Muslims’ homes and cultural spaces. Furthermore, 
European countries established legislations banning religious symbols, a move done to 
hide the true intention of banning the Muslim veil, making it difficult for Muslim 
women from practicing a normal life while wearing the veil. While theoretically they 
seem to be advocating for migrants and their inclusion, in practice, through their 
security-infused integration policies, Europe has targeted Muslim migrants in a new 
security regime, specifically tailored for migration. 
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 1 
Introduction   
 
W. E. B. Du Bois, historian, sociologist, and civil rights activist, wrote on 
stigmatization saying, “the facing of so vast a prejudice could not but bring the 
inevitable self-questioning, self-disparagement, and lowering of ideals which even 
accompany repression and breed in an atmosphere of contempt and hate.”1 He was 
explaining the struggles of African Americans who were questioning whether it was 
necessary for them to reject their identity to become American and whether this 
rejection should be considered their duty as American citizens. The context in which 
Du Bois was writing was specific to African Americans and their struggles, however, 
his writing resonates with many people of different races, ethnicities, religions, and 
even cultures. It is not uncommon to find that minorities are treated differently or 
suspiciously in different societies. In the Americas, Irish immigrants were considered 
too “brown” and were suspected of spying for the Vatican, Asian Americans were 
considered ineligible for citizenship, until 1952, because they were considered aliens, 
and Jewish Americans were denied voting rights because they were not perceived as 
full Americans.2 Similar events occurred in Europe where riots broke out between 
French workers and Italian immigrants in the early 1880s and early 1890s and anti-
Semitic massacres in Russia in the 1880s.3 It is therefore not surprising that similar 
incidents take place today, albeit in less physically violent ways and more subtle ways. 
More recently, during the 1990s, migrants have been treated more suspiciously by both 
the media and the general public, compared to earlier periods where they were able to 
assimilate easier, and governments responded by associating migrants and migration 
policies to public issues and disorders.4 This association resulted in an agenda by which 
governments established integration policies and citizenship laws which migrants find 
very difficult to adapt to making it difficult, if not impossible, for them to assimilate in 
new societies.  Europe has been the desired destination for many migrants, escaping 
economic or political hardships in their countries of origin. Western Europe in 
 
 
1 ARIANE CHEBEL D’APPOLLONIA, Introduction in MIGRANT MOBILIZATION AND SECURITIZATION IN 
THE US AND EUROPE: HOW DOES IT FEEL TO BE A THREAT? 1, 1 (2015). 
2 Id. 
3 Id., at 2. 
4 Id., at 2-3. 
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particular is often considered one of the ideal regions where people who are having 
troubles in their home countries can go to receive more opportunities. This phenomenon 
is not new or even recent, in fact Europe has been accepting labour migrants for decades 
because of the limited skilled labour available domestically. However, in more recent 
years the number of migrants increased exponentially due to domestic conflicts, lack 
of economic opportunities, and societal problems elsewhere in the world, which people 
attempt to escape through migration. When it comes to refugees particularly, some 
choose to travel to the receiving countries legally, going through the proper channels, 
while others, who do not have the resources, travel illegally hoping that the risk they 
are taking and the obstacles they encounter will pay off. However, Europe’s response 
to those who attempt to travel legally is not necessarily welcoming. In fact, in recent 
years European countries have established policies making it harder for people to enter 
their borders and policies that make it harder for migrants already within the borders to 
integrate or become naturalized citizens. In recent decades, migration became 
associated with security issues because it is believed to be a danger to public order and 
the national identity. European countries have linked migrants to issues such as 
terrorism and trafficking. In response, the policies established by governments give 
privileges to nationals while excluding migrants, and policies which limit the ability of 
migrants to live in these societies.5 This agenda is political in the sense that 
governments and political parties associate security issues with migrants and therefore 
campaign for crackdowns against migrants, and it has also become legal, where 
governments pass legislations limiting the abilities of migrants from living peacefully 
if they do not conform to certain conditions set by the countries. In Europe, the term 
‘immigrant’ has become linked to the Muslim identity.6 It is therefore not surprising 
that the security agenda in Europe has been increasingly targeting Muslims. The 
European public has determined that religious practices different from theirs are a threat 
to their way of life.7 And while many in Europe do prescribe to the Muslim faith, they 
are often treated with suspicion and derogation because their faith is almost always 
associated with negative connotations such as radicalism, fundamentalism, terrorism, 
 
 
5 Jef Huysmans, The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, 38 JOURNAL OF COMMON 
MARKET STUDIES, 751, 752-753 (2000). 
6 The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations, GALLUP, 1, 11 (2009). 
7 Id., at 19. 
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and public disorder. The European public also believes that Muslim migrants in Europe 
may not be as loyal to their country of residence as they should be. In fact, when asked 
if they believed that Muslims living in the country were loyal to it, thirty-five percent 
of the French public, forty-five percent of the German public, and forty-nine percent of 
the British public answered that they did not believe Muslims were loyal.8 Similarly, 
those who believed that it was necessary to be less expressive when it comes to religion 
in order to properly integrate were between thirty to forty percent in each of the three 
countries.9 This is an indication of how Muslims in Europe are considered a threat to 
the European identity and it also shows how proper and complete integration is 
associated with less expressions of religion. Consequently, European governments 
have associated Muslims and Islam in general with security problems that require 
securitization. This thesis argues that European policies towards migrants, established 
under the guise of integrating migrants into European societies and easing the transition 
for their future, were in fact used to exclude and securitize Muslim migrants. It outlines 
the different interrelated approaches taken by the European Union in order to integrate 
migrants through integration policies and citizenship laws that appear to be in favour 
of integration and which demonstrates the European Union’s desired integrated society 
but which in fact contain many problems and harsher conditions making it more 
difficult for migrants to integrate while simultaneously allowing security forces more 
powers against migrants. Chapter 1 defines certain key terms which creates the path by 
which this thesis moves towards explaining how racism, fascism, xeno-racism, and 
institutional racism take place in European countries and how these phenomena 
continue to manifest against migrants today. Chapter 2 focuses on integration policies 
and citizenship laws in the European Union. This chapter briefly shows a history of 
migration in Europe then delves into the exclusionary reforms of integration policies 
and citizenship laws. First, it looks at the right to asylum-seeking and how it has been 
received by Europe, its correlation to trafficking, and the shifts in policy and 
legislations towards control and exclusion in response to asylum-seeking. Next, the 
chapter examines the European Union’s approach to integration of immigrants through 
the different steps and policies the European Union has taken and continues to take 
 
 
8 Id., at 20. 
9 Id. 
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which, on the surface, appear to be promoting the importance of integrating migrants. 
Then it examines how Europe began to practice exclusion more broadly within its 
integration policies and citizenship laws by showing how the policies are fraught with 
problems making them difficult to implement. This is accomplished by looking at some 
of these policies and laws in different countries and how each country had its own 
method by which they chose to make it harder for migrants to integrate or for them to 
become naturalized citizens. . Chapter 3 looks at the different aspects of securitization 
against Muslim migrants. Europe has often made the claim that Muslims are associated 
with terrorism and jihadi groups and this chapter shows how Europe has made use of 
these claims and used them to securitize and exclude Muslim migrants, rather than 
properly accept them and integrate them. The chapter first explores the securitization 
of Muslims in educational institutions. This is outlined in the example of ‘The Case of 
the Nottingham Two’ which shows the structural racism of academic institutions in the 
UK. The chapter then goes on to examine the securitization of Muslim migrants in other 
spaces such as their homes or mosques. It offers examples of how security forces 
labelled Muslims as terrorist or jihadis, how the media took up this label, and the 
resulting raids undertaken against Muslims based on little to no evidence. Finally, the 
chapter explores one gendered policy which specifically affects and securitizes female 
Muslim migrants, the veil ban. It outlines Europe’s response to the veil historically, and 
how Europe deals with the veil as an oppressive symbol that must be eliminated. It 
looks at the experiences of Muslim women wearing the veil and how they were 
excluded, and sometimes even shunned, from their schools, universities, and even 
workplaces. It also looks at the legal responses of European courts in cases of religious 
freedom and freedom of expression pertaining to the veil, and the subsequent effect 
these responses had on some governments, such as in Germany. This chapter outlines 
the different ways and the different places where Muslim migrants have been 
securitized and excluded. Finally, the conclusion attempts to combine how the 
integration policies and citizenship laws, with their harsh conditions and exclusionary 
standards, have contributed to this securitization. It shows how the policies instated by 
Europe were severely unrealistic to the extent that they had begun the exclusionary 
process before the securitization, and it is because these migrants were excluded from 
the society that they became targets of the securitization. By looking at the Europe’s 
colonial history combined with the change in Europe’s response to migration, this thesis 
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outline how law and policy have been used as tools to advance Europe’s securitization 
agenda against Muslim migrants and how Europe has responded to certain violations 
of human rights be creating legislations that will justify these violations.    
 
 
 6 
I: Racism, Fascism, and Xeno-racism in Europe   
 
Much of Europe’s current history and practices are of a neo-colonial nature. The 
colonial period brought capitalism into Europe, and with the development of a capitalist 
system in Europe, certain ideologies began to spread, including racism.10 The 
exploitation of labour used to advance European society brought a system of oppression 
which took on a racist form that could not be separated from the economic oppression. 
Intending to show that race, while not the main factor for imperialism or colonialism, 
is still a major factor that cannot be treated as a coincidence, C. L. R. James, historian 
and Pan-Africanist stated that, “… to think of imperialism in terms of race is disastrous. 
But to neglect the racial factor as merely incidental is an error only less grave than to 
make it fundamental.”11 Therefore, it is not surprising to claim that today Europe 
practices some forms of racism, even if not as explicitly as it did in the past. The 
ideologies embraced by European countries have done little to eliminate ethnic, racial, 
gender, or class discrimination, and neoliberal policies in the EU often created a 
disadvantage for a specifically defined group of people.12 This is true for the minorities 
who often find themselves excluded from the state’s protection or policies and it is also 
true of the groups who are often targeted, by both the state and the general public, under 
misguided notions that they do not belong or that they are disrupting the public order. 
Migrants in Europe suffer from this treatment, regardless of the reason they travel to 
Europe, and Muslim migrants suffer even more because of their chosen identity, where 
they experience exclusion, derogation, and even securitization. The legacy left behind 
by colonialism meant that migrants, especially those coming from minority 
backgrounds, felt like outsiders when traveling to Europe. When asked about what 
identity he would attribute to himself one individual said, “I would never say I am 
English because I am not…. You have to look at what makes up that identity being 
Muslim [sic] how many times do you hear about Britain accepting Muslims as part of 
 
 
10 WALTER RODNEY, Africa’s Contribution to the Capitalist Development of Europe-The Pre-Colonial 
Period, in HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA, 73, 84 and 88 (2012); Robert Knox, Valuing race? 
Stretched Marxism and the logic of imperialism, 4 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 81, 85 (2016). 
11 Rodney supra note 10 at 89. 
12 Quentin Duroy, Neoliberal Europe: Enabling Ethno-Cultural Neutrality or Fueling Neo-Nationalist 
Sentiment, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES 469, 472-473 (2014). 
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their community.”13 This feeling of exclusion experienced by minorities, and the 
subsequent securitization they face because of it, is not only due to the general racism 
that still exists in Europe but also because of the differences between Europeans and 
migrants, physical and otherwise, which makes Europe hesitant about accepting 
migrants, and more prone to ostracizing them.  
There are three major forms of discrimination, practiced by Europe, that are 
relevant to this thesis. These three forms are racism, fascism, and xeno-racism. In 1985, 
following several examples of discriminatory behaviour in different European 
countries, the European Parliament formed a committee titled ‘Committee of Inquiry 
into the Rise of Fascism and Racism in Europe’ (hereinafter the Committee of Inquiry). 
This Committee produced a report defining the two terms, racism and fascism, 
outlining certain examples of how Europe has engaged in these practices and how some 
remnants continue to linger, and some recommendation on how to address these 
problems. In their effort to define fascism, experts outlined several different themes 
believing they were crucial in coming up with a definition, such as virulent nationalism, 
xenophobia and racial superiority, and they presented these themes to the Committee.14 
Additionally, experts also recommended that the term should be used within a historical 
perspective, for example confining its usage to the periods in inter-war Europe when 
the term was used to describe certain active movements.15 The Committee of Inquiry 
also adopted a two-fold definition of racism. The first part of the definition can be found 
in the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, adopted by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) General Conference 
in 1978. This definition stems from the idea that there is no scientific basis to prove 
that any one race is superior to another, and consequently no one race is inferior to 
another.16 The second part of the definition comes from the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This definition identifies the 
types of discrimination, including the common ones such as race and colour, and also 
 
 
13 Yasmin Hussain & Paul Bagguley, Citizenship, Ethnicity and Identity: British Pakistanis after the 
2001 ‘Riots’ 39 SOCIOLOGY 407, 415 (2005). 
14 Committee of Inquiry into the Rise of Fascism and Racism in Europe: Report on the Findings of the 
Inquiry, EUR. PARL. 1, 18 ¶ 27, (1985).  
15 Id., ¶ 28. 
16 Id., at 19 ¶ 39. 
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adds some other categories such as birth, national origins, and ethnic origins.17 
However, using the term racism can sometimes fail to express the various problems 
that arise. This prompted the use of the term racialization instead of racism because it 
provided a more multi-layered and multi-dimensional frame of what racism involves. 
Using the term racialization instead of racism allows for an intersectional analysis and 
places the individual in multiple positions, therefore looking at different forms of 
identity such as race, ethnicity, gender or class combined thus looking at how 
discrimination can produce complex social relations. This in turn also allows for 
avoiding the more simplistic binary understanding of racism.18 In addition, and for the 
purpose of this thesis, it is important to define institutional racism as this is one of the 
main forms of racism tackled. Institutional racism is the inability of an organization to 
provide services to people due to their race, culture or ethnic origin.19 As for xeno-
racism, it was defined by A. Sivanandan, emeritus director of the Institute of Race 
Relations: 
It is a racism that it not just directed at those with darker skins, 
from the former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of 
the displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted, who are beating 
at western Europe’s door, the Europe that helped to displace them 
in the first place. It is a racism, that is, that cannot be colour-coded, 
directed as it is at poor whites as well, and is therefore passed off 
as xenophobia, a ‘natural’ fear of strangers. But in the way it 
denigrates and reifies people before segregating and/or expelling 
them, it is a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism. 
It is racism in substance, but ‘xeno’ in form. It is a racism that is 
meted out to impoverished strangers even if they are white. It is 
xeno-racism.20 
 
 The above definitions explain the different experiences faced by Muslim 
migrants who travel to Europe. Many practices that take place in Europe by the state 
and/or society fall within the definitions of racism, fascism, and xeno-racism. In fact, 
 
 
17 Id., ¶ 39. 
18 Coretta Phillips, Institutional Racism and Ethnic Inequalities: An Expanded Multilevel Framework, 
40 J. SOC. POLICY, 173, 174-5 (2011); Ali Rattansi, The Uses of Racialization: The Time-spaces and 
Subject-objects of the Raced Body, in RACIALIZATION: STUDIES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 271, 271 
(Karim Murji and John Solomos ed., 2005). 
19 Floya Anthias, Institutional Racism, Power and Accountability, 4 Sociological Research Online ¶ 2.1 
(1999). 
20 LIZ FEKETE, The Emergence of Xeno-Racism, in A SUITABLE ENEMY RACISM MIGRATION, AND 
ISLAMOPHOBIA IN EUROPE 19, 19-20 (2009) (citation omitted). 
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the establishment of the European Union (hereinafter the EU) implies a form of 
discrimination based on national origin through the separation of nationals of member 
states from nationals of non-member states.21 This in turn lead to the establishment of 
a European identity, one in which outsiders, those who are not white or secular or 
Christian are considered not European. The distinction this made between European 
and non-European resulted in a perceived illegitimacy in terms of residency, cultural, 
social, and political rights, and even resulted in repressive national policies limiting 
rights of residency and travel.22 Several members of the EU were creating massive 
regularizations and others were establishing repressive legislation regarding borders 
and the entry and exit of foreigners.23 This combined with the integration policies and 
citizenship laws established by several European members of the EU illustrate how 
racism affects Muslim migrants traveling into Europe. Not only that, but several 
European countries have experienced a resurgence of right-wing and fascist groups. 
Countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece 
have right-wing regimes, extremist groups or neo-Nazi and pro-Nazi tendencies. And 
it was not only fascism that Europe practiced, but it also practiced xeno-racism, most 
commonly on migrants, but also on ethnic minorities such as the Roma people.24 
The Roma were originally Indo-Aryan travellers who increasingly migrated 
from northern India to Europe but nowadays the Roma make up Europe’s largest ethnic 
minority, and most hold citizenship from a country belonging to the EU.25 With the 
increasing fascist and right-wing political groups in European countries, the Roma have 
also become targets of racial profiling and violence often being displaced and evicted 
or subjected to racist leaflets associating them with terms such as ‘delinquency’ and 
‘vandalism’.26 The fact that the Roma people were considered different from majority 
citizens made them subjects of xeno-racism. Discrimination in Europe does not target 
 
 
21 ÉTIENNE BALIBAR, Droit de cité or Apartheid?, in WE, THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE?: REFLECTIONS ON 
TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP, 31, 44 (2003). 
22 Id., at 44-45. 
23 Id., at 45. 
24 Roma integration in the EU, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-
fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/roma-and-eu/roma-integration-eu_en (last visited Dec. 
31, 2019). 
25 Id.; Roma People, Encyclopædia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rom (last updated 
Nov. 28, 2019). 
26 Liz Fekete, Europe against the Roma, 55 RACE & CLASS 60, 62 (2014). 
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only those from different religions such as the Nazis against the Jews or different races 
or other common discriminatory identifications such as race or gender, but they also 
target those in Europe, who hold European citizenship, but are too different, whether it 
is because they speak different languages, belong to different ethnic groups or 
otherwise. This is where xeno-racism comes to play in Europe, where even those who 
belong or identify as being European are targeted because they are impoverished or 
because they are ethnically different. Muslims in Europe, while not exactly struggling 
the same way as the Roma people, do experience similar issues. Muslims traveling to 
Europe are often labelled criminals and terrorists because of their religion and their 
non-conformity to European standards and identities and sometimes even European-
born Muslims feel excluded because they are believed to be too different, because of 
their religion and because the majority do not see them as fully European. Europe 
continues to practice the same racial profiling and discrimination it always has, but 
now, instead of doing so through physical violence and war, it does so through 
legislations, such as citizenship laws and the ban on religious symbols, and through 
policies, such as integration policies, that are unfavourable towards migrants and make 
it harder for them to be feel included in new societies. 
It is also safe to say that while Europe has its own faults, and those of course 
play a bigger role in its inclusion and integration policies, it is also deeply affected by 
international incidents which can alter its perceptions and shift its focuses elsewhere. 
The September 11, 2001 attacks (hereinafter 9/11 attacks) that took place in the United 
States is one such example. The 9/11 attacks were a tragic incident, one which had so 
many ramifications affecting different regions, even though the attacks themselves may 
have taken place elsewhere. The so-called ‘War on Terror’ was announced and its main 
enemy became those who adhere to the Muslim faith. Europe was one of the regions, 
as an ally of the United States, which shifted its focus majorly towards addressing the 
issues posed by foreigners entering its borders, and particularly those who are 
Muslim.27 Counter-terrorism policies established by the EUpost-9/11 redefined 
terrorism, a definition which disguised xeno-racism it practiced under the guise of 
 
 
27 LIZ FEKETE, Anti-Muslim Racism and the Security State, in A SUITABLE ENEMY RACISM MIGRATION, 
AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN EUROPE 43, 43-4 (2009) 
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national security.28 Europe’s response to the 9/11 attacks was so disproportionate that 
their counter-terrorism policies targeted anti-globalization protests, animal rights 
activism and other movements so far removed from terrorist organizations and al 
Qaida.29 The new definition of terrorist activities encompassed not only violence 
perpetrated for political reasons but also included actions that would cause serious harm 
to a country or an international organization or an action that would force a government 
to behave in a certain manner.30 Europe used the wave of fear that arose from the 9/11 
attacks to justify their newly established policies and the increasing securitization 
against anything too foreign, especially migrants, to protect national security.31 In fact, 
it was the recurring use of the phrase ‘national security’ that allowed Europe to get 
away with racial profiling with little to no outcry from the public, because the public 
would not argue in the face of a threat against the ‘national security’ or the ‘national 
interests’ of the state.32  It did not help matters that the German authorities had found 
out that the plans for the 9/11 attacks took place in Hamburg, and the July 7, 2005 
London bombings certainly exasperated the case against Muslims even more.33 
Muslims who have long settled in Europe, for decades, if not longer, have suddenly 
become targeted. Even Muslims who held European citizenships or were European-
born were not exempt from the xeno-racism practiced by European countries both 
because their faith has become the enemy when it comes to the ‘war on terror’ and 
because they threaten the European identity.34 Islam was, since then, associated with 
violence, aggression, and terrorism, which associated its adherents with the capability 
of committing such actions.35 Europe also began questioning where the loyalties of its 
Muslim residents lay, whether it was with the European states that hosted them or with 
the faith that they adhere to. In fact, one individual commented that the lack of global 
 
 
28 Id., at 43. 
29 Id., at 45. 
30 Id., at 45. 
31 Id., at 46; Christina Boswell, Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the Absence of 
Securitization, 45 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 589, 589 (2007). 
32 FEKETE, supra note 27, at 46-7. 
33 Id., at 44-5; Peter Mandaville, Muslim Transnational Identity and State Responses in Europe and the 
UK after 9/11: Political Community, Ideology and Authority, 35 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 491, 
491 (2009). 
34 FEKETE, supra note 27, at 44. 
35 Javaid Rehman, Islamophobia after 9/11: International Terrorism, Sharia and Muslim 
Minorities in Europe - The Case of the United Kingdom, 3 EUR. Y.B. MINORITY ISSUES 
217, 227 (2003-2004) 
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outcry from Muslims over the 9/11 attack, signified that there was no struggle within 
Islam over morality of certain actions, and this would result in a struggle between Islam 
and the West.36 Muslim individuals and communities were increasingly targeted in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. One Muslim organization, the Islamic Human Rights 
Commission, reported that in September 2001, around 206 incidents of violence and 
other harmful acts were recorded in Britain.37 Britain passed an Anti-Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act in 2001 which included measures allowing special forces more power 
to arrest and detain, and which included new illegal acts that would allow the courts in 
the United Kingdom to deal with crimes occurring outside its national jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, one section of this Act allows the Home Secretary the ability to issue a 
certificate, one which would sanction the continuous detention, against any non-UK 
national based on the fact that he believes this person is a threat to the national security 
of the state and that this individual is suspected of terrorism.38 In addition to this Act, 
the UK government passed a Human Rights Derogation Order in 2001. The UK found 
it problematic for suspected terrorists to remain within its borders. However,  article 3 
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
better known as the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the ECHR), 
states that subjecting individuals to torture or other inhuman treatment is prohibited.39 
Similarly, the Soering principle states that foreign individuals may not be extradited if 
there is a possibility that they would be tortured or subjected to inhuman treatment.40 
Passing the Derogation Order would therefore allow the government to contravene 
against the existing provision in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
and against the Soering principle.41 Following the 9/11 attacks, Muslims, short-term 
and long-term residents, migrants, and even citizens have suffered from the 
ramifications. Integration policies and citizenship laws were reformed in a crackdown 
on anyone was to their faith rather than to Europe, as if they were mutually exclusive. 
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Muslim men, women, and children were all subjected to what European governments 
and individuals considered an appropriate response to the attacks whether in schools, 
workplaces, or even in their homes and communities. Xeno-racism in Europe had found 
its new target and began the processes of establishing newer, harsher criteria for 
integration and citizenship and securitizing their communities to ensure that their 
loyalty was to Europe and that their identity fit in with the European liberal secular 
identity. Under these circumstances, Muslims in Europe, particularly those coming 
from migrant backgrounds, have been increasingly targeted under these newer policies 
and have been victims of European states and their actors who label them as criminals 
and terrorists thus justifying their violent treatment and securitization. Europe, like 
many others, associated migrants with security problems thus they believed that the 
best response towards them is securitization.  
In a manifestation of institutional racism, Muslim migrants often find 
themselves targets of policies that prevent them from integrating into societies, 
naturalizing as citizens, or even freely living with their chosen faith. In fact, many 
Muslims suffer through raids and questioning against their person, their homes, and 
their mosques and they sometimes even suffer with being told what they can and cannot 
wear. Muslim migrants in Europe find themselves on the outside of the society, where 
despite being urged to integrate, they have no way of doing so due to the difficulties 
imposed by the state. European countries included conditions in their integration 
policies and citizenship laws that are impossible to fulfil for many of the migrants 
entering Europe, especially those who enter as asylum-seekers or refugees, resulting in 
migrants being stuck between their desire to integrate in this society that allowed them 
entry, due to imposed obligations from the government and the general public, and their 
loyalty to their identity which retained from their origin countries. In fact, because they 
are treated suspiciously, Muslims in Europe have experienced varying degrees of 
securitization such as restricted borders and racial profiling.42 Furthermore, Muslims 
entering Europe believed they were targeted by border controls due to their religion, 
and the Muslim Council of Britain reported that Muslims in the United Kingdom felt 
threatened and marginalized since the 9/11 attacks. Not only that but Muslims in 
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Europe were concerned about the direct effects certain policies would have on them 
such as security legislations, policies that ban wearing religious symbols, and others.43 
All the aforementioned examples show how Europe, despite calling for the integration 
of migrants, have made them victims of policies that are more securitizing than 
integrating and which make them feel more excluded than accepted.  
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II: Exclusionary Reforms of Citizenship Laws and Integration Policies   
 
Following the Second World War, and with the booming economy, many 
European countries looked to immigration as the method by which labour shortages 
could be reduced. Countries first looked to individuals coming from other European 
countries but that was not sustainable for long. As a result, some countries, such as 
France and Britain, began to look at individuals coming from their former colonies in 
North Africa, South Asia, and the Caribbean. Before long, the rates of migration to 
Europe increased and brought in people from far more nationalities. However, the drop 
in the world economy in the 1970s meant that most migrants decided to remain in 
Europe, despite the instated bans and not only that but entry of migrants into Europe 
continued in the form of workers’ families and refugees.44 This process was repeated 
in late 2000 when the European Commission indicated that EU countries should allow 
for legal migration due to the ageing workforce and declining birthrates.45 This form of 
‘managed migration’ had two results: the first was fulfilling the gap created by the need 
for skilled labour and the second was leading Europe to the abolition of the right to 
seek asylum.46 In response to the displacement of people due to the break-up of the 
former communist zone of influence and because of globalism’s demand for free 
markets and free trade from the Second and Third World countries, the First World 
countries realized they had to interfere to secure their benefits. These First World 
countries wanted to create an environment suitable for accumulation and establish a 
new a legal and economic structure for the world economy, and they also wanted to 
manage immigration by creating controls that would decide whose movement can be 
free around the world and whose movement had to be restricted.47 From then on, and 
because the number of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers entering Europe was 
increasing, countries realized they would need to create certain controls, adopt certain 
policies, and reform certain laws all in order to ensure that the newcomers they were 
hosting were either dealt with appropriately, in the case of those seeking asylum which 
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was considered an illegal act, or were sufficiently integrated in the hosting community, 
in the case of migrants or refugees. These new policies would mark the beginning of 
the securitization agenda against migrants.  
As mentioned above, European countries instated certain methods of control to 
deal with asylum seeking, which was considered an illegal act.48 This illegalization of 
asylum seeking in Europe came about mainly in response to the anti-trafficking agendas 
of First World countries. North American, Australian, and European countries have 
cooperated in supranational and intergovernmental bodies to gather information on 
migratory flow, and this information would then inspire the creation of regional 
policies.49 Many of these bodies would gather information on migratory flows, advise 
countries on preventing migration from one region to another, and even make 
recommendations on dealing with issues such as trafficking and smuggling.50 This last 
role was the focus of most bodies in more recent years, to the extent that the EU, the 
Group of Eight industrialized nations (G8), and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, which also includes Canada and the United States, declared the 
year 2000 as the year of the ‘anti-trafficking plan’.51 This focus on trafficking meant 
that displacement of people was regarded with more hostility and that the right to seek 
asylum, protected by international law, was ignored.52 In fact, the Smuggling Protocol 
of the 2000 United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (hereinafter 
the Smuggling Protocol) states that migrants must be seen as complicit in illegal 
migration.53 In article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(hereinafter the Refugee Convention), the drafters of the Convention recognized that in 
some cases refugees may have to resort to illegal measures to enter a country if they 
were escaping threats. Accordingly, the Convention states that such refugees may not 
face penalties by State Parties so long as they report to authorities and provide a good 
reason for their illegal entry.54 On the other hand, the Smuggling Protocol explicitly 
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criminalizes any and all acts of migrant smuggling. This means that any individual who 
is found to be helping migrants to enter a territory illegally will be subjected to criminal 
prosecution.55 As a consequence, refugees, who could enter a territory illegally, 
provided they have a good reason, under article 31 of the Refugee Convention could 
no longer do so under the Smuggling Protocol, because any help given to them has 
become a criminal offense. Therefore, the Smuggling Protocol has deprived many 
migrants, seeking refuge abroad, of the options available under the Refugee Convention 
and implicitly categorized them as part of the problem. Nevertheless, the anti-
trafficking focus of these bodies merits praise due to the dangers associated with 
trafficking and smuggling and the issues that arise from it, such as sexual slavery, organ 
harvesting and other acts. However, transforming the anti-trafficking agenda into a 
method for criminalizing asylum creates a problematic phenomenon when asylum 
seekers are automatically labelled as illegal migrants. By adopting this stance, Europe 
began to securitize its asylum system. Asylum seekers became the cause of trafficking 
and the subjects of this new security regime.  
The right to seek asylum is an internationally recognized right that protects 
individuals from the threat of persecution in their home countries. This right can be 
explicitly found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in article 14(1) which 
states, “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.”56 Furthermore, the right to seek asylum can be inferred from the Refugee 
Convention.57 This Convention was originally written with the events prior to 1951 in 
mind, particularly the era of the Second World War when people were fleeing within 
Europe. However, in 1967 a Protocol to the Convention removed the limitations 
relating to time and geographical region making the Convention applicable 
universally.58 This Convention is not without problems. For instance, despite the fact 
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that there were refugees in Third World countries around the time of the drafting of the 
Convention, these refugees were considered unimportant until the period of the Cold 
War during which they were seen as having some value. This shows that even during 
the time of the drafting of the Refugee Convention some refugees were considered, in 
some manner, more important than others. In comparison to European refugees for 
example, Third World refugees were said to be falsely claiming asylum to hide the fact 
that their reason for moving was economic rather than political. Furthermore, Third 
World refugees were considered different because, in most cases, they were displaced 
due to an internal rather than an international conflict and this meant that the post-
colonial state was to blame.59 However, the provisions of the Convention did allow for 
asylum-seeking despite the aforementioned problems. Article 1(A) of the Refugee 
Convention lists the conditions by which an individual can be considered a refugee 
under the Convention. Subparagraph 2 of the same article states that refugees include 
any individual who, “… [O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”60 Additionally, 
as mentioned previously, article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention states that State 
Parties to the Convention should not impose penalties on any refugee who enters their 
country illegally if they are coming from a territory where they have been threatened 
subject to the fact that any person who enters illegally go to the authorities and provide 
a good reason for their illegal entry.61 However, the official text of the Convention 
states that individuals must “show good cause for their illegal entry or presence,” 
however they did not define the term ‘good cause’ nor did they indicate what could 
constitute as a good cause. Looking at the preparatory works of the Convention 
indicated that, indeed, ‘good cause’ was not defined. However, a commentary by Dr. 
Paul Weis, who participated in the preparation and adoption of the 1951 Convention 
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and its 1967 Protocol, showed that a refugee’s inability to legally enter any country to 
escape persecution is ‘good cause’.62 However, by the time the Cold War ended, 
refugees were no longer welcome in the North and this began a series of regulations 
limiting asylum seekers to those who were considered normal by virtue of being white, 
male, and anti-communist.63 Despite the fact that most, if not all, European countries 
are State Parties to the 1951 Convention, Europe criminalized asylum seeking as part 
of its anti-trafficking agenda.64 European countries began to create measures that would 
work to integrate officially recognized refugees and in the meantime they would 
attempt to totally exclude asylum seekers with a set of controls.65 In clear contravention 
of the right to seek asylum and article 31 of the Refugee Convention, the EU intended 
to establish policies that would criminalize illegal entry.66 In the United Kingdom, 
asylum seekers were the subject of a system of welfare provision linked to immigration 
controls rather than social care, under the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, in 
addition to a detention system which worked to contain asylum seekers and treat them 
as suspected individuals.67 The 1996 Immigration and Asylum Act in the UK took away 
the housing and financial support given to asylum seekers who did not manage to 
declare asylum at a port of entry, therefore they had to be supported by local authorities. 
These authorities were obligated to provide housing and food for the poor under the 
National Assistance Act 1945 and the Children Act 1989, so they began to resent 
asylum seekers who added to the burden on their budgets.68 A new Immigration and 
Asylum Act in 1999 meant that asylum seeking was now an issue of immigration 
control. This new act stripped asylum seekers their ability to apply for housing through 
local authorities and specified that asylum seekers housed through the National Asylum 
Support Service (NASS), a new body which was established to monitor the controls, 
could be legally evicted with a seven day notice and without the ability for legal 
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action.69 Furthermore, the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act provided that any person 
who was under immigration control, such as individuals who were waiting for approval 
to remain in the United Kingdom or those who were allowed to remain subject to certain 
conditions, were in many cases not eligible to receive benefits such as accommodation, 
healthcare, welfare provisions, or other benefits, even if homeless or destitute.70 From 
1999, reports of abuse began where asylum seekers often found themselves in 
overcrowded housing facilities or hostels with inedible food, inadequate sanitation, and 
disregarded safety measures.71 In fact, some European countries such as France and 
Sweden went further and violated the principle of non-refoulment, which states that no 
person can be returned to a country where their life or freedom is threatened, by 
deporting foreigners who were thought to pose a security risk.72 
 With regards to asylum seekers, Europe had shifted its policy towards a form 
of control and expulsion. The policies they undertook were meant to cause asylum 
seekers to rethink their decisions of entering Europe as they would be facing 
detrimental treatment and treated like criminals. On the other hand, there were policies 
of assimilation and integration, which were more targeted towards migrant workers, 
officially recognized refugees, residents, and potential citizens. The EU has undertaken 
several initiatives in order to better integrate migrants residing in the EU in the past few 
decades. In November 2004, the Council of the European Union produced a press 
release in which it outlines eleven common principles for an immigrant integration 
policy in the EU, the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the 
EU. These principles maintained that integration is a two-way process requiring the 
input of both immigrants and residents of the EU Member States, that integration 
requires respecting EU values as well as knowledge of the host’s language and history, 
that employment and education are key aspects of integration, that integration requires 
immigrants have access to goods and services in a non-discriminatory manner equal to 
that of national citizens, that practicing different religions and cultural norms be 
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safeguarded, and more.73 Later, in 2011, the European Commission created a European 
Agenda aimed at the integration of third-country nationals and called for strong and 
consistent approaches to realize this goal.74 Furthermore, in 2014, the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council, in line with the ongoing support of the EU towards Member States to 
integrate migrants, reaffirmed the EU Common Basic Principles for Immigrant 
Integration Policy adopted in 2004.75 The EU supported Member States in establishing 
integration policies that fit within their national policies, yet despite the efforts, third 
country national continued to face more difficulties than EU nationals76 In 2016, the 
European Commission wrote the Action Plan on the Integration of Third Country 
Nationals, a communication which reaffirmed the need for the effective integration of 
third country national into EU states and how to achieve this integration. The Action 
Plan was meant to reaffirm the EU’s commitment to integrating third country nationals, 
through the investment of resources and the participation of relevant actors, in the light 
of increasing discrimination and racism, in addition to upholding the fundamental rights 
of the EU to achieve a more cohesive society.77 The policies set out in the Action Plan 
ranged in areas from education to culture but they all were meant to support the goal of 
successful integration of migrants.  The policies included pre-departure and pre-arrival 
measures, education, integration into the workforce and providing access to vocational 
training, access to basic services, and finally, participation and social inclusion.78 The 
pre-departure and pre-arrival measures are meant to help those who are relocating to 
adjust to the new societies prior to their travel. Pre-departure measures focus on the 
relocating individuals and how best to equip them to the new society they are entering 
and they include measures such as language and job training, providing information on 
the new country as well as their rights and duties, and training in other skills which 
would make their integration easier. Pre-arrival measures however focus more on the 
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receiving state and preparing it to welcome the newcomers and they include measures 
such as the “Share City Curriculum”, a toolkit developed by SHARE Network which 
was partly financed by the European Commission and which targeted the resettlement 
and integration of refugees.79 Next are the education measures, and these include 
language training, and also includes learning basic skills for employment and social 
inclusion, educating children and providing support for the children who might need it 
such as refugees, Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) which plays a role in 
learning how different societies come together and which has proven beneficial in 
addressing societal issues such as poverty and exclusion, and finally learning the values 
and laws of the receiving state. In applying these policies, the European Commission 
suggested the establishment of online language learning and assessment courses, 
supporting children, schools, welcoming classes, low-skilled people, and the 
participation of both boys and girls in ECEC.80 Employment and access to services such 
as housing and health services are also some of the aims of this action plan. The 
European Commission aims to recognize the qualifications of the newly entered 
individuals, identify the best ways to promote entrepreneurship, provide vocational 
training, and offer proper housing and health services for individuals.81 Finally, when 
it comes to participation and social inclusion, the Commission suggested programs that 
promote cultural diversity and social inclusion of youth, as well as promoting the 
participation in political, social, and cultural life and combatting discrimination.82 
Further policies undertaken by EU countries included language tests, codes of conduct, 
and even reforming citizenship laws to take into account security issues.83 While these 
policies on the surface seemed beneficial for the foreigners entering a European country 
because they would allow them to integrate into the new community they were entering 
and hereby were likely to provide them with increased safety within the host country, 
they masked a hidden agenda by which host countries were attempting to move from a 
society of multiculturalism to one of monoculturalism.84 Due to stereotypes practiced 
by European governments, multiculturalism was associated with religious 
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fundamentalism and cultural differences were associated with criminal practices.85 This 
made it easier for European countries to hide the policies that would end 
multiculturalism in the form of measures to eliminate religious fundamentalism and 
criminal practices associated with cultural differences. With this in mind, countries 
began to study why previous integration policies had failed and began establishing new 
policies meant to assimilate foreigners into their communities, protect national identity, 
and achieve cultural homogeneity.86 The policies outlined in both the Common Basic 
Principles for Immigrant Integration and the Action Plan for Immigrant Integration are 
examples of the more recent steps taken by the EU to integrate migrants. However, 
these new policies are also somewhat problematic. The policies put forward by the 
European Commission and the Council of Europe in both documents are idealistic, in 
the sense that they provide an idea of what the desired final society will look like after 
integration is complete rather than the process undertaken by the states to achieve this 
integration.87 Furthermore, the EU calls for a uniform approach to integration to be 
undertaken by the different states to form a coherent process of integration. However, 
this is very difficult to achieve because it assumes that migrants and their host societies 
are homogenous and does not take into account the different national policies of EU 
Member States. Moreover, these approaches tend to neglect the different levels of 
migrants, for example newcomers versus third-generation migrants, and treats them all 
under the same banner.88 As a result of these problems, it is often the case that EU 
Member States take different steps to achieve integration based on their respective 
national policies as well as the existing society, therefore, it is often the case that some 
states may have much harsher integration conditions than others which in the end makes 
integration a very difficult process. 
In the effort to protect the national identity of European countries, certain 
aspects of identity were frowned upon: multilingualism, when languages were not 
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European, and dual citizenship were viewed unfavourably.89 Some countries even 
wished to restrict the citizenship rights of second- and third-degree youths while certain 
measures relating to family reunification allowed states to perform an integration test 
on children over twelve before allowing them entry.90 New measures established by 
European countries were collectively and popularly known as an ‘integration 
contract’.91 The integration contracts differed from one country to another but it was 
always linked to national identity and it always made applicants for citizenship go 
through certain measures to prove they have accepted European and EU values.92 One 
of the most elaborate integration contracts was done by the Netherlands where it 
targeted newly arrived immigrants, Dutch-born children of immigrants, and even those 
who held passports from Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. The Netherlands was also the 
first European country to suggest that integration should begin when migrants were still 
in their country of origin by passing the Integration Abroad Act.93 However, individuals 
were exempted if they held a certificate stating that they were officially integrated or if 
they were citizens of EU member states, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, the United 
States, New Zealand, and Japan.94 This is a clear example of the dramatic and 
exaggerated response one country had to foreigners, to the extent that even those born 
within the country, and those who held passports from the country’s constituencies 
were considered a threat to the national identity. Not only that, but it is a display of how 
Europe attempted to distinguish between those who could be ‘good’ citizens and those 
who could not reach that level.95 It was the beginning of the securitization of migrants 
under the banner of integration. However, not all policies undertaken by EU countries 
to integrate foreigners were inherently problematic.  
One of the most common policies European countries have passed to integrate 
migrants into European societies was language tests. The Language Policy Unit of the 
Council of Europe created a project on the linguistic integration of adult migrants 
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(LIAM).96 Through this project the Language Policy Unit hoped to support European 
states into creating language policies that would be based on a set of values, which 
included respect for human rights.97 The Council of Europe found that the enactment 
of language policies were particularly important for cases of residence and 
citizenship.98 In addition, a survey conducted for the sake of the project found that 
countries had in fact begun to enact such legislation for residence, citizenship, and, in 
some cases, even entry, and some countries also mandated language tests for anyone 
who wished to gain residency or citizenship.99 While learning the language of the host 
country was a policy that is seemingly beneficial for both the foreign individuals and 
the state and admirable for the sake of pursuit of knowledge, European countries, as we 
have mentioned previously, discouraged multilingualism when the languages were not 
European thereby making the knowledge of a non-European language a threat to the 
national identity.100 Furthermore, the language requirements became much more 
difficult that it excluded all but those who were highly educated.101 Another policy was 
the introduction of civic tests alongside the language ones to teach potential residents 
and citizens, as well as refugees, the values of European societies.102 Additionally, 
applicants for citizenship had to pass a loyalty test. In Germany, this took the form of 
a test that would reveal private beliefs of an individual, specifically regarding the issue 
of sexuality.103 Denmark, however, took matters too far when the first Liberal-
Conservative coalition government (2001-2006) introduced a citizenship exam so 
difficult that it included language requirements so high that equated the requirements 
of higher education, history questions that even parliamentarians had trouble 
answering, a declaration of loyalty stating “I will work actively for the integration of 
myself and my family into Danish society,” which had to be signed by citizenship 
applicants, and stipulations that citizenship applicants had to work, pay taxes, not hit 
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their children, and respect equality between genders. 104 This was condemned by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) because it assumed that 
citizenship applicants would not respect the values of the society and that they would 
commit the prohibited acts mentioned.105 And while the UNHCR makes a very valid 
point, there are many other problems with this test. For instance, the fact that the 
language requirements, which had previously been measured by the basic knowledge 
of the language, has gone so high that only those who have reached the level of higher 
education can pass it is quite troubling. Raising the expectations so high shows that 
Denmark was clearly working towards the exclusion of a number of people who do not 
have the means or the resources to attain higher education. Furthermore, the fact that 
some Danish parliamentarians were unable to answer all the history questions is highly 
controversial because they are not only citizens but also citizens who represent the 
Danish government. The fact that Denmark expected citizenship applicants to pass a 
test which its own parliamentarians had trouble with is absurd. Countries also instated 
penalties for failing these tests, and they differed from one country to another. These 
penalties included being forced to leave the country, paying fines, cutting social 
security payments, and even limiting or losing residency rights.106 Some of these 
penalties are, again, more inherently problematic than others. For example, 
immigration laws that allowed the deportation of non-citizens who exhibited 
‘unacceptable behaviour’ were established throughout Europe.107 In addition, new laws 
allowed European countries to revoke the citizenship of an individual if he or she 
displayed ‘unacceptable behaviour’. This is an indication of the state’s power of 
identifying the criteria upon which an individual can be recognized as a citizen.108 It 
also gives states the power to change these criteria to maximize their own interests. In 
fact, states have given intelligence services the power to decide on citizenship requests, 
and this power is practically unrestrained that the intelligence services do not have to 
justify their reasoning for rejecting a citizenship request and the individual’s right to 
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seek legal action is largely limited.109 This allows intelligence services to take 
advantage of individuals seeking citizenship by persuading them into spying on their 
countries as a way to establish their loyalty to the host state and therefore be afforded 
citizenship. Hassan Assad, a Palestinian who is in danger of being deported from 
Sweden to Jordan, believes he was refused Swedish citizenship because he refused to 
act as police informer for the Swedish Security Services, and thus they accused him of 
funding terrorism based on the fact that he donates money to charities in the Occupied 
Palestinian territories.110 
Similarly, the policies adopted in the 2016 Action Plan on the Integration of 
Third-Country Nationals were not without problems. While the measures seem 
advantageous theoretically, they are very hard to implement because they make many 
presuppositions that may not entirely come to pass. For example, the pre-departure and 
pre-arrival measures assume smooth cooperation between the country receiving the 
individuals and the country of origin of the individuals. However, this cooperation, 
according to the European Commission, is not developed enough.111 This makes it 
much more difficult to apply these measures simultaneously, particularly when 
relations between countries are unfavourable. Similarly, when it comes to education, 
and social inclusion, the European Commission again presupposes certain things such 
as the ability to access online courses, and the automatic acceptance of the new 
individuals into their societies and children into schools. However, the reality is that 
most of the time, particularly in the case of refugees, access to the Internet, the 
workforce, and even schools for children as well as the general acceptance in society is 
not easy. Refugees may not have the means or the resources to access certain things 
such as the Internet, therefore it would become the state’s responsibility to provide 
access to such means and resources, and as mentioned, many state and local authorities 
believed this to be a burden. Furthermore, discrimination, as shown in the previous 
chapter, is an inherent issue in many societies in Europe, therefore, to automatically 
assume that migrants or refugees entering the state will be able to integrate into the 
society by promoting social inclusion is unreasonable. Combatting discrimination is an 
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admirable measure suggested by the European Commission, however, it is not a 
measure meant for integrating migrants or refugees but a measure that must be instated 
merely for the sake of being a decent society. Therefore, it is evident that the 
reformations of the citizenship laws and the newly established integration policies can 
be heavily criticized. The integration policies were designed in ways which allowed 
Europe to determine who was acceptable for inclusion in their societies and who was 
not. Because Europe tended to associate migrants with problems such as trafficking, 
they began to treat them as security threats prior to their crossing European borders. 
Europe’s attempt to force migrants into integrating because their fears pertaining to 
crimes but also cultural heterogeneity and the loss of national identity caused them to 
establish integration policies that were so outrageous making it harder for migrants to 
integrate, which created an “integration paradox”.112 And even though these policies 
are meant to apply to anyone who falls within the European countries’ radar, those who 
are most affected were minorities and particularly Muslims who had to face these 
issues, especially after the 9/11 attacks, and who have since faced securitization in their 
places of work, schools, communities, and even clothing. The integration policies 
masked security policies that explicitly targeted Muslim migrants under the guise of 
preventing radicalization and therefore protecting public order. Europe used integration 
to hide its agenda of securitizing and alienating certain groups of people.    
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III: Europe’s Attitude Towards Muslim Migrants   
 
Since the 9/11 attacks, Muslims in Europe have been the subject of various 
security discussions and policies that aim to deradicalize them if they were to stay in 
Europe. In fact, the importance of the security agenda increased exponentially 
following the 9/11 attacks and national security became a term widely spread to ensure 
that the public understood that this security agenda was for their benefit.113 The 
securitization of Muslims in Europe, since then, took many forms. The effects of the 
integration paradox, the consequence of integration policies which in practice made it 
harder for migrants to integrate, meant that Muslim migrants were often treated as 
suspect communities in need of securitization. Borders became an essential institution, 
necessary to segregate people based on social conditions using passports or identity 
cards as a systematic criterion.114 Integration policies were akin to a physical wall 
erected to intercept national security threats, and now these walls have evolved into a 
non-physical form meant to limit the movement of people, including migrants, and to 
stop the dilution of the national identity that would result from the entry of those racially 
or ethnically different.115 Border controls and integration policies are entangled with 
the security agenda to keep those inside the state protected and those outside 
excluded.116 As a consequence, governments began to increasingly target Muslim 
people and communities in their War Against Terror and the general public wanted to 
distance themselves from those who belonged to the Muslim faith. Individuals residing 
in Europe felt the change in treatment towards them. One person living in Britain 
explained it as, “… if you are Muslim then people don’t want to know you and with all 
the propaganda to do with Islam at the moment,” while another said, “We feel like 
outsiders in our own country…. Because before I was part of a community, whether 
there was integration or not that is completely irrelevant. I was part of a community, a 
British community in England. Now I am part of a criminal element in Bradford.”117 
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Not only did they have to go through the same integration policies that other migrants 
had to go through, but Muslims, both residents and newcomers, have also had to bear 
the brunt of attacks on their person, their homes, their assets, and even their mosques.118 
Securitization occurred through monitoring, as is the case in educational institutions, 
where European security forces observe Muslims for any sign of radicalization because 
it was expected of them. Security forces in European countries also raided Muslim 
communities and homes with the belief that they were harbouring terrorists or that the 
residents in these homes are involved in terrorism plots, most of the time with no proof 
of these accusations. Additionally, securitization took the form of legislations meant to 
restrict Muslim migrants from practicing their beliefs peacefully, as is the case of the 
ban on religious symbols, which hid the true agenda of the European desire to ban 
Muslim women from wearing the veil. All these forms of securitization show how 
Europe has managed to alter its course from purely integration to a combination of 
integration and securitization with an emphasis on securitization because Europe 
believed that Muslim migrants could not be trusted to fully embrace European values 
and European society. Not only that, but this response to Muslim migrants helped 
Europe further their campaign towards shifting away from multiculturalism and 
allowed Muslims to be labelled as dangerous, criminals, or terrorists making them easy 
targets for Europe’s fight against terrorism. Europe’s disproportionate response to 
Muslims within their territories created a sense of paranoia where anything different is 
considered dangerous and Muslims were not exempt. European countries have created 
policies that limit Muslims from living a harmonious life. The religious profiling of 
Muslims in Europe has affected their lives within their homes, their work environment, 
their education, their clothing, and even their ability to manifest their religion. In the 
midst of calls for integration, Muslims in Europe who are targeted in the widespread 
security policies and the securitization agenda are more likely to disintegrate and more 
likely to respond to the distrust they face by radicalization.119 
Because of the threat Europe associates with Muslims, security and intelligence 
forces began to increasingly target Muslims, particularly male youth, due to the belief 
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that they are vulnerable to radicalization and therefore must be placed under the 
purview of anti-terrorism laws.120 For instance, Muslim youth are considered potential 
threats, regardless of their level of educations. In fact, studies have showed that higher 
level of educations makes migrants more sensitive and more aware of discrimination 
against them.121 Those educated understand the problems facing Muslims worldwide 
and increased their awareness of inequalities and prejudice therefore they likely to be 
alert to racism and discrimination but it also makes them more prone to be recruited by 
Islamic groups in universities. On the other hand, less educated youth can be recruited 
by jihadi groups, extremist preachers, and even online groups because they can often 
be alienated due to their religion and their low level of education.122 Looking into issues 
that are considered ‘anti-social’ or ‘undesirable’ such as extremist views on books or 
other forms of media meant that Muslim youth are subjected to anti-terrorist laws.123 In 
fact, some universities in the EU were instructed by their governments to subject 
foreign Muslim students to extra surveillance. A 2005 report titled ‘When Students 
Turn to Terror: Terrorism and Extremist Activity on British Campuses’ identified 
certain educational institutions as breeding grounds for terrorist activities. It also 
recommended that educational institutions cooperate with MI5 and allow plain-clothed 
officers onto campuses to monitor students.124 This report led to several 
recommendations and advices to educational institutions such as guidelines to target 
violent extremism, guidelines to deal with extremist literature, and ways to monitor 
religious student organizations and separate the moderate from the radical.125 And 
while some of these recommendations are useful in the sense that it can help 
universities understand what may cause the radicalization of otherwise moderate 
students and attempt to address the root cause of such radicalization, most of these 
recommendations are ridiculous in the sense that Muslims are automatically considered 
threats and potential terrorists. These recommendations are recognizing Muslims as the 
problem rather than acknowledging the need to look at the reasons why they are 
radicalized, and they are accepting that the best way to implement anti-terrorist laws in 
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campuses is to completely violate the privacy of these Muslim students by spying on 
them and treating them like criminals before a crime is committed. These 
recommendations neglect the surrounding factors that may lead to Muslims becoming 
radical and are ironically, they are calling for actions that may on the long-run lead to 
more radicalization. In fact, a 2008 case commonly known as ‘The Case of the 
Nottingham Two’ is an example where a similar recommendation to monitor students 
in universities completely backfired. This case follows two individuals in the 
University of Nottingham, British master’s student of Pakistani descent, Rizwaan 
Sabir, and Algerian staff member, Hicham Yezza, who had resided in the UK for 13 
years.126 Sabir was on a graduate track which would expect him to begin his Ph.D. once 
he completed his MA. His research for his MA dissertation revolved around Al Qaeda 
in Iraq and radicalization topics and as part of his research, he often consulted with 
Yezza who was a friend of his as well as a junior administrator for the School of Modern 
Languages in the University of Nottingham.127 Because of this friendship, Sabir sent 
three documents related to his research to Yezza so that he may print them for him, 
which were later found by another administrator, a colleague of Yezza who he allowed 
access to his computer while he was away from work. One of the documents found on 
the computer was ‘The Al Qaeda Training Manual’ which constituted part of Sabir’s 
research into Al Qaeda and radicalization.128 Sabir accessed this document through the 
United States Department of Justice website, and in fact, it could have been ordered 
through an inter-library loan system at the University of Nottingham’s library and in 
2011 a copy was made available at the library.129 Because of their possession of this 
document, Sabir and Yezza were arrested and questioned for six days.130 Both 
individuals were released with no charges, however Yezza was later re-arrested for 
immigration offenses because his visa had run out.131 While the senior management of 
the University of Nottingham was reluctant to allow Sabir to remain, he managed to 
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complete his MA under the assumption that he would then be beginning his Ph.D. 
However in order to do so he had to receive a mark of 60 percent of above, which he 
did not manage to do ending up with a mark of 58.3 percent which, had it been 0.2 
percent higher, could have been rounded up to 59 percent and from there to 60 percent 
under his school’s regulations. The Head of the School, Professor Heywood, sent an 
email to different actors at the university, including the Vice-Chancellor and the Dean, 
informing them of Sabir’s MA marks and how they could not be rounded up, and 
therefore proposed that Sabir be informed that he could not be awarded a place in the 
Ph.D. program.132 However, it was later found that Sabir’s initial acceptance required 
him to achieve a passing mark, 50 percent, on his MA to be eligible for a place in the 
Ph.D. program. Upon learning this, Professor Heywood sent another email to the same 
list of people which stated, “Further to my message of last week, I have learned today 
– to my considerable irritation – that the offer letter to Rizwaan Sabir simply stipulated 
a pass at MA, rather than the School’s usual standard of at least 60% …[this]… none 
the less leaves us with no grounds to refuse entry.”133 While Sabir began his Ph.D. at 
Nottingham, he was advised to start another Ph.D. in another university because the 
management at Nottingham would not be helping him, advice which Sabir took and 
began a Ph.D. in Strathclyde University despite initially not wanting to leave 
Nottingham.134 While this case also outlines some of the problems with the 
management of the University of Nottingham, the key issue presented here is that the 
increased monitoring of Muslims, without understanding the context and not bothering 
to question the motives, led to assumptions being made that these Muslims were 
involved in terrorist activities. This in turn led to the baseless arrest of two individuals, 
one whose future might under different circumstance have ended, because security 
forces advised that a good way to prevent terrorism and radicalization would be spying 
on minorities.  
It wasn’t only educational institutions where intelligence and security forces 
targeted Muslims, but also mosques and homes. Intelligence services believed that 
mosques were places where Muslims went to for jihadist networks and radicalization 
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occurred, and the media often portrayed mosques as places where hate was spread.135 
The portrayals of Muslims in different media forms has also influenced the way of 
thinking of politicians who link Muslims’ failure to accept Western identities to the 
spread of terrorism, and who believe that radicalization and terrorism in Muslims is a 
result of failing to integrate and the failing multicultural society, which they believe 
produces the enemies arising from within.136 Security forces labelled foreign Muslim 
preachers, or imams, as a risk because their teachings in mosques were believed to 
catalyze youth radicalization.137 The media expanded on this belief by reporting on a 
number of imams who were in fact guilty of radicalization, such as Najm Faraj Ahmad, 
a Kurdish imam in Norway who was arrested for his Taliban-style teachings, and 
Finsbury Park imam Abu Hamza al-Masri, who was arrested for inciting murder and 
racial hatred; a scare tactic used to show the public the dangers Islam has on Western 
societies and identities.138 Consequently, journalists began to enter mosques believing 
that they will be able to uncover nefarious terrorism plots, and often their recordings or 
photographs are used by security forces to justify raids on mosques and mosque-goers, 
despite distortions or incomprehensibility, and are sometimes used as evidence in the 
security forces’ cases against imams.139 Germany’s intelligence services takes matters 
slightly further and monitors all Muslim organizations, even the non-violent ones, 
labeling them as ‘Islamist’ because they go against German ideals and can likely lead 
to radicalization.140 Raids escalated beyond mosques to include homes of Muslims in 
the community. In Spain, one individual, Smail Boudjelthia, reported that he was 
awoken by the door being blown open thinking there was a fire and that those who 
entered were firefighters, but was forced face-down by armed police and questioned 
about how many times he visits the local mosque and accused of being linked to 
terrorist groups.141 This accusation stemmed from the belief that Boudjelthia knew an 
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al-Qaeda suspect in a case which the French had requested Spanish help from. 
Boudjelthia had admitted that this suspect stayed in the same apartment he did, however 
he also said that most Algerians who arrive in Banyoles stay in the same place and that 
the local Red Cross often brings Algerians there asking for help.142 Some reports even 
discussed police breaking into homes where women, children, and pregnant women 
resided.143 For example, a family of three, including an 18-month old girl found 
themselves in a similar situation when police raided their home, accusing the father, 
Mohammed Nabbar, of leading and giving orders in a terrorist group. Several items 
taken from Nabbar’s house such as bottles containing cologne and cooking oils, his 
daughter’s medicine, alarm clocks, and manuals used by Nabbar to learn about 
electronics were presented as evidence that he was helping plan a terrorist attack.144 
Several Muslim organizations criticized increased police violence against Muslims and 
Muslim communities and explained how the actions of security and intelligence 
services are harming cooperation between organizations and government 
institutions.145 These organizations condemned terrorism but they also outline how 
unreasonable it is to blame an entire community for the actions of a few.146 And in fact, 
this is what Muslims often have to suffer through. The actions of a few are almost 
always held over the entire Muslim community whether they agree with them or not. 
Additionally, the disproportionate response from governments often means the 
Muslims may be held accountable for actions that not only did they have no knowledge 
of, but also actions which they wholeheartedly disagree with. Furthermore, government 
responses where Muslims are labeled as criminals or terrorists often do more harm than 
good. The above examples show how Muslims are often accused of terrorism-related 
crimes with little to no evidence and because of incomplete accounts, and this 
generalization, combined with responses of violence, arrests, and imprisonment, can 
lead to the exact thing that intelligence and security forces are attempting to fight with 
anti-terrorism laws. However, securitizing Muslims does not stop at monitoring their 
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day-to-day activities, spying on their education, or raiding their cultural spaces, it even 
goes so far as to control the way Muslims dress in public. 
One of the policies that have increasingly affected Muslim women in Europe is 
the veil ban. Religion is what Europe considers the biggest hindrance to the complete 
integration that could be achieved by newcomers due to secularism and the belief of 
some that religion is not fundamental.147 As such, it made sense for European countries 
to establish legislations by which major displays of religion were prohibited, and by 
doing so, they would eliminate the obvious or apparent hindrance, forcing new-comers 
into the first step towards integration. This was also considered important to address 
the issue of divided loyalties displayed by new-comers who held an attachment to their 
own identity.148 The veil ban does not only prevent women from manifesting their 
chosen religion in the way they prefer, but it also affects their ability to receive an 
education, in the case of younger girls, or their ability to work, in the case of older 
women. The veil ban is a constant topic of discussion in Europe and is often explored 
under the banner that the veil is a tool used by Muslim men to oppress Muslim women, 
therefore, it is always associated with negative connotations and subsequently must be 
banned.149 France’s President in 2009, Nicholas Sarkozy, stated that the burqa was not 
a religious problem but one regarding liberty and dignity and he equated the burqa to a 
symbol of subservience and debasement.150 Because of these beliefs, many Westerners 
believe that they must “liberate” veil and burqa-wearing women therefore they give 
support to bans on these forms of dress.151 It would be ignorant to say that all women 
who wear the veil have chosen to do so, because some are in fact forced into wearing 
it due to societal, familial, or even state pressures. However, it is as equally ignorant to 
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believe that if some women are forced into wearing the veil then that must mean that 
all women who wear it are forced into doing to. Subscribing to this belief creates 
problems and calls into question those Muslim women who attempt to come out and 
declare that they have chosen to wear the veil or the burqa, therefore, Muslim women 
generally are often not asked to give their opinion on the matter.152 However, some 
have come out in the defense of how the veil can be a choice. Freelance writer Hanna 
Yusuf describes the veil as a symbol of emancipation from societies that objectify 
women. She does not specifically say that the veil in and of itself is emancipatory, 
seeing as it is an article of clothing, just as nudity is not liberating, but that the choice 
to wear it is what makes it so. Additionally, Professor Leila Ahmed, a distinguished 
Islamic feminist whose analysis on the veil won her the University of Louisville 
Grawemeyer Award in Religion, has said that Muslim women in the West are choosing 
to wear the veil for their own reasons rather for ones imposed on them by others.153 
Another commonly considered reason for applying prohibitions on the veil relates to 
integration within European societies, and this reason is often raised when it comes to 
the face-veil.154 Despite the facts that Muslims have been migrating to Europe 
throughout the last few decades, if not longer, immigration of Muslims is viewed almost 
resentfully throughout the region and legal bans on the veil were justified as a way of 
integrating the minorities into the West and adapting them to Western traditions.155 The 
ban on the veil has gained support, because it meant an embrace of secularism and the 
exclusion of religion, and as mentioned previously, it safeguarded women’s rights. In 
addition, some people considered the veil a symbol of religious fundamentalism and 
saw it as a threat to public security, therefore they supported the ban.156 Similarly, there 
were those who supported the face-veil ban because it hindered the principle of “living 
together”. This principle is based on the fact that because the face is a major part of 
communication, the face-veil inhibits those wearing it and the public from 
communicating and interacting therefore limiting their ability to participate in 
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society.157 In fact, in S.A.S. v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter 
the ECtHR) considered the full-face veil a valid exercise of religion yet it prevented 
people in France from “living together”. While “living together” on its own was not a 
valid reason to limit the rights of religious freedom and freedom to manifest beliefs, 
found in Article 8 and 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court found 
that it was an element that can be found within the protection of the rights of others. As 
such, if a woman wears a full face-veil and covers her face, she can be found to be in 
breach of the right of others to socialization and this would make “living together” more 
difficult.158 This concept brings about a double standard where some policies taken by 
states do in fact hinder the idea of “living together”. For example, gentrification is 
undertaken by many states to turn low-income neighbourhoods into neighbourhoods 
more attractive to the middle-class in order to appear more developed and to achieve 
more racial and economic integration. However, this process, in turn, leads to the 
displacement of lower income residents who will no longer be able to reside in these 
neighbourhoods due to the increased economic value.159 This shows a double standard 
in the sense that gentrification displaces many people making it harder for different 
people to “live together” but the process is undertaken regardless because on the surface 
it assumes the integration of different social classes and creates the appearance of 
harmonious societies therefore it is considered beneficial, despite the harm to the lives 
of those displaced. However, when Muslim women wear the face veil, they are 
considered to be harming society because the belief is that they are unable to socialize 
enough to realize the concept of “living together”. The issue becomes that wearing the 
veil does not conform to European values and identities. It is in fact considered a 
hindrance because it does not allow women who wear it to fully and effectively 
integrate into society. A common European conception that has a colonial history is 
that the veil is a tool used by Muslim men force women to be subordinate, accordingly 
the veil ban represents the emancipation of the oppressed Muslim women in the 
European imagination. And because of their disregard for women who wear the veil 
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voluntarily, and that the veil violates European values of secularism, liberalism, and 
women’s rights, European courts have received a fair share of cases regarding the veil. 
Similar to the above examples of the securitization of Muslims in educational 
institutions, mosques, and homes, Muslim women have battled their right to wear the 
veil in education institutions and workplaces in European courts, both national and 
regional.  
The first known legislation that included a ban on veils was a law passed in 
France in 2004, Law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004, which prohibits the wearing of 
religious symbols in French public schools.160 When drafting the law, French President 
Jacques Chirac and a government advisory commission intended it to ban conspicuous 
religious symbols which would have included Islamic headscarves, large Christian 
crosses, Jewish skullcaps, and Sikh turbans, which were not included in the drafts but 
were likely to be included in the legislation.161 Minister of National Education, Luc 
Ferry, stated that the law intended to do more than ban such symbols and would require 
students to accept what is taught on the Holocaust and attend biology and physical 
education classes. This came amidst complains from teachers regarding Muslim 
students’ rejection of the Nazi slaughtering of the Jews, Muslim girls boycotting classes 
on human reproduction for being too graphic, demands for gender-segregated physical 
education classes, requests for prayer breaks during final examinations, and calls for a 
ban on pork in school cafeterias.162 While Ferry did not intend to single out Muslim 
students, he did not have to as most Jewish-Orthodox students who would have 
participated in similar complaints attended private Jewish schools where such issues 
were not present.163 The consequences of enacting the ban led to several expulsions of 
minors, mostly Muslim girls.164 France reported that in the first year of the Act’s 
implementation 39 students were expelled while French newspaper Le Monde reported 
that it was in fact 47 students who were excluded and a further 96 who chose not to 
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return. Throughout the years less and less students chose to wear prohibited attire; 
however controversy arose when one 15-year old Muslim girls was expelled for 
wearing a headband and a long skirt which were considered to be too religious.165 It is 
easier to study the impact of the veil ban on Muslim female students, on account of 
their numbers, however it is not only students in educational institutions that are 
affected by such prohibitions but also Muslim women in the workplace, including 
teachers. Muslim teachers wearing the veil have been subjected to problems due to the 
enactment of similar legislations. In Dahlab v. Switzerland, a Swiss primary school 
teacher was prohibited from wearing the headscarf during her professional duties by 
the Director General of Public Education.166 This case was presented to the European 
Court of Human Rights which declared that the headscarf seemed to be forced on 
women by the Quran and that it did not fit with the values of gender equality. 
Furthermore, it confirmed the findings of the Swiss Federal Court that the veil cannot 
be reconciled with the values that must be embodied by teachers in a democratic society 
and presented to their students, such as tolerance, respect for others and equality and 
non-discrimination.167 Given that the ECtHR was trying to spread a message of 
embracing tolerance, it is quite ironic that in spreading tolerance they reinforced a 
prohibition on an individual’s choice of expression and identity which is quite literally 
the opposite of tolerance. However, this is also not surprising as the veil, as Europeans 
have deemed it, seems to be offensive and threatening to the European identity, 
therefore they find it necessary to restrain this threat against European values. In 
Germany, a similar situation took place where a German of Afghan origins, Fereshta 
Ludin, presented her case to municipal and state courts after her application to become 
a teacher was rejected by the Board of Education in the state of Baden-Württemberg, 
in 1998, because her headscarf identified her as belonging to the Islamic faith.168 Ludin 
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lost all her cases and in 2002, the German Federal Administrative Court in Berlin stated 
that teachers must not display any religious symbols in class because they act as state 
representatives. However, in 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court, Germany’s 
highest court, overruled this ruling and said that Stuttgart school authorities should not 
have barred Ludin from teaching while wearing the veil because no such legal ban was 
enacted in Baden-Württemberg. The court also said that if states did not wish to employ 
teachers wearing the veil then an unambiguous law banning religious symbols in 
classrooms must be enacted. As a result of the court’s statement, German states’ 
education ministers put out statement that they were planning to enact such legislation. 
In 2004, when Baden-Württemberg enacted said legislation, the High Courts had to 
determine whether it was constitutional, the proper interpretation of religious symbols, 
and whether the legislation was exclusively aimed at Muslim teachers. The Federal 
Administrative Court ruled that the legislation enacted in Baden-Württemberg was 
unfair because it applied strictly to Muslim women; the Court stated that, “exceptions 
for certain forms of religiously motivated clothing … [was] out of the question.”169 
Since then, half of Germany’s federal states have enacted legislation that bans teachers 
in public schools from wearing religious symbols, and in the case of Berlin and Hesse, 
this ban also extends to public employees in the justice and law enforcement fields. 
Additionally, many of the German state that enacted these legislations have created an 
exception for Christian clothing and symbols because they conform to and represent 
Christian-Western values and traditions.170 While at first glance, it seemed that the 
German Federal Constitutional Court upheld Ludin’s right, and the rights of other 
women in similar positions, to manifest her religious beliefs in the way she chooses, it 
in fact created a loophole and presented the idea to German states that if they wish to 
ban veil-wearing women from the workplace, then legislations must reflect this ban. 
This loophole allowed a number of German states to enact a ban on wearing the veil by 
teachers and other public employees, not only that, but it encompassed all religious 
symbols, with the exception of Christian clothing and symbols because those are 
considered representative of European identities. However, educational institutions are 
not the only places where such bans take place, whether against students or teachers, 
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but they occur in workplaces and other cultural spaces as well. Similar cases have also 
happened in Belgium, where a workplace banned an employee from wearing the veil, 
and in France, where an employee was fired for wearing the veil due to a customer 
complaint. Both employees appealed to the European Court of Justice for their cases 
and the Court stated that headscarves may be banned in the workplace if employers 
have a general ban on political, philosophical, or religious symbols. Because the 
employers in the Belgian case had such a ban, the employee’s dismissal was upheld. 
However, in France, the dismissal was not upheld because it was based on a customer’s 
complaint and it was not a non-discriminatory occupational requirement.171 However, 
in some cases it is the interpretation of the laws that causes unresolved questions 
regarding the legality of prohibitions on the veil. For example, in 2002, the German 
Federal Labour Court decided that a saleswoman should not have been fired from her 
job for wearing a veil yet, in 2014, the same court ruled that church employers could 
forbid employees from wearing the Muslim veil. Additionally, in 2015, the German 
Constitutional Court ruled that headscarf bans for teachers in state-funded schools were 
unconstitutional because they did not threaten to impair the peace at school, a ruling 
they affirmed in 2016.172 Therefore, it seems like a large part of the problem is that 
there is no clear-cut understanding of how the prohibition should be enacted, or even 
why the prohibition is enacted at all.  
Additionally, Muslim women who wear the veil have been prevented from 
participating in leisure activities, particularly in France, due to the prohibition of the 
veil. Mennel Ibtissem, a participant in the singing contest, the Voice, was ostracized 
for appearing in the contest wearing a hijab. The aforementioned contestant’s decision 
to appear wearing the veil unnerved many people to the extent that they began to 
campaign against her. Going through her social media presence, they discovered that 
she had showed support of conspiracy theories about terror attacks in France, but they 
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failed to realize that she was only twenty years old, and they failed to scrutinize other 
similar-aged people’s social media in the same way to see what they supported. Due to 
these circumstances, and the ongoing witch-hunt against her, Ibtissem decided to 
withdraw from the competition.173 Furthermore, in 2016, French mayors across the 
country attempted to ban Muslim women from wearing full-body swimsuits, more 
commonly known as burkinis, with anti-burkini decrees, and beginning with the 
cancellation of a burkini event at a theme park in Marseilles. Then-Prime Minister 
Manuel Valls supported the ban and claimed that the burkini was provocative and 
archaic.174 A famous incident related to the anti-burkini decrees involved four armed 
policemen approaching a woman on a beach in Nice and forcing her to remove some 
items of clothing in order to comply with the ban, as well as issuing her an on-the-spot 
fine.175 However, women have lately taken to protesting the burkini bans in France. In 
an early-2019 campaign named “Operation Burkini” Muslim women, inspired by Rosa 
Parks, defied the burkini-ban by going swimming in two different public pools amidst 
support from other swimmers. While the women were apprehended by police, fined, 
and banned from using public pools for one month, they, according to the Citizens 
Alliance of Grenoble, attempted to challenge a situation where women had to choose 
between their religious beliefs and accessing public spaces. The city closed down both 
pools involved in the incident and statements by the city hall spokesperson and mayor 
Eric Piolle described the protestors as using “tactics of shock and buzz”.176 Also earlier 
this year, a French sportswear company was forced to suspend the sale of a sports 
jogging hijab it produced in Morocco because it received backlash from politicians and 
on social media calling it a violation of French secular values and because they feared 
for the safety of their staff who were insulted and threatened on social media.177 It seems 
that France is moving towards an elimination of veil-wearing Muslim women from the 
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public sphere. France has certainly been the most committed European country when 
it comes to enacting prohibitions on the veil, and it also seems to be setting a precedent 
for other countries. 
It is not surprising that Europe has taken such a stance against Muslims, whether 
they are citizens or migrants, even though migrants may face more backlash for being 
non-European. The above examples show that Europe’s racism, which has been one of 
the themes upon which it has been built, continues to live on despite the end of 
colonialism. During the colonial era racism took the form of anti-blacks, Europe itself 
had cases of anti-Semitism and ethnic cleansing, and now it has taken the same stance 
against Muslims who seem to be threating the European identity and European values. 
That is not to say that Muslims’ native countries are perfect, in fact many countries 
have their own problems. For example, it is no secret that many women in Muslim-
majority countries are in fact forced into wearing the veil, and that there is a strong 
cultural emphasis on the role of women in these societies, resulting in many of these 
women struggling to emancipate themselves from these expectations and, in many 
cases, struggling to fight for their right to dress how they want. This is evident for 
example in the social media movement started by Masih Alinejad, an Iranian woman, 
who protested the mandatory veil. Alinejad posted an unveiled picture of herself on 
Facebook which began a series of posts from herself and other Iranian women who all 
wanted to feel the same freedom of being allowed to unveil. With the influx of response 
from other women, Alinejad began a campaign called ‘My Stealthy Freedom’ as a way 
to showcase how women in Iran had to struggle to achieve some semblance of freedom 
when it comes to the veil. 178  This example shows how women in Iran, and countless 
women in different parts of the world, are struggling for the ability to be free in their 
home countries. Therefore, it would be remiss to say that Muslim-majority countries 
are without similar problems; however, it is the idea that in escaping similar societies 
in the hope of finding a better life, Muslims traveling to Europe are still scrutinized and 
profiled. It is not only that their rights are violated for the sole reason that they are 
Muslim but also that they are accused of being offenders and lawbreakers. It is the idea 
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that because they are Muslim this means that they are a danger to Europe and that their 
identity automatically makes them evil. Europe has placed so much emphasis on their 
whiteness, their secularism, and their liberalism, that any other identity is deemed non-
European and not capable of being European. Racism, fascism, xeno-racism, and all 
other forms of discrimination Europe practices is their way of ensuring that the 
European identity remains protected and that no threats can harm this identity in 
anyway. It does not matter that this identity was a product of slave trading or genocide, 
what is important is that the European identity was superior then and that it continues 
to remain superior today. 
 46 
Conclusion      
 
With the influx of migrants, Europe began a new securitization program 
targeting non-Europeans entering the continent. Many European countries established 
policies that appear to integrate but actually aim to securitize migrants, especially in 
the case of Muslim migrants in Europe. Europe’s colonial and racist history haunts 
today’s migration law and policy. It would be remiss to say that the 9/11 attack were 
the sole reason why Muslim migrants have faced increased securitization, however it 
was, without a doubt, a catalyst. Scholars have discussed the effect of the 9/11 attacks 
and the legislation passed in response on immigration and integration policies. Post-
9/11 found a development in border control, an increase in anti-terrorism and anti-
trafficking measures, and exclusionary policies towards migrants, as well as an 
increased fear of migrants and the rise of anti-migrant groups.179 Today, Muslim 
migrants are particularly impacted by sinister immigration laws, especially after the 
9/11 attacks when attitudes towards Muslims shifted to hatred and distrust. After 9/11 
many new immigration policies were passed and were as a whole known as the 
“securitization of immigration governance.”180 Under this banner, Western 
governments, political parties, the general public, and the media began to perceive 
immigration as a security problem.181 In response, the Europe Union adopted 
integration policies and citizenship laws which theoretically aimed to help migrants 
assimilate into new societies, but in reality, these laws and policies where too difficult 
to fulfil making it harder for migrants to integrate and effectively made them excluded. 
The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU is one of the 
examples of the EU’s approach to integration. In theory, the implementation of these 
principles would have been a positive and significant step towards the integration of 
migrants in the EU. These Principles call for the input of both immigrants and 
governments as well as giving immigrants access to goods and services like any natural 
citizen and also allowing for different religious practices with no-discrimination. 
However, the actual policies being applied in the EU differ greatly than what the 
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Common Basic Principles have called for.  Governments began to think of the 
integration of migrants as a step towards limiting multiculturalism and towards curbing 
the perceived threats that migrants may cause otherwise. Furthermore, the expectations 
of government officials and migrants when it pertains to integration are quite different. 
Government officials emphasize the importance of migrants to exhibit loyalty and 
conform to the identities of the dominant. In other words, government officials, more 
prominently those in Europe, want migrants from minorities to reject their own 
identities and replace them with the identities of the majority. On the other hand, 
migrants believe that integration means that they are accepted into society with the 
addition of being able to retain their own identities while living in harmony and 
respecting the existent dominant identities.182 Consequently, the worrying over the 
harmonization within society and the fear of disintegration forced governments to adopt 
integration policies that are inherently exclusionary.183 This does not only put 
governments and migrants into a never-ending cycle of trying to include those they 
excluded but it also causes problems between minority migrants who are unsure of what 
is expected from them and majority citizens who believe migrants are unwilling to 
integrate. As a result, Muslim migrants are often judged based on their religious identity 
because Europeans are under the impression that they are not fully loyal to the state 
that has accepted them.184 Maintaining a religious identity is linked to unwillingness to 
integrate by the European general public, therefore, exhibiting loyalty to the Muslim 
identity translates to the same thing. In fact, in 2006, Europeans from different countries 
believed that Muslims preferred being separate from society.185 Therefore, it is evident 
that an element of identity factors in with the potential integration and securitization of 
Muslim migrants. Given that Europe believes that religious identities are a hindrance 
towards full integration, it is not strange that the established integration policies and 
citizenship laws require migrants to demonstrate their willingness of forgoing religious 
teachings in order to be fully integrated. This is evident when it comes to integration 
policies such as those in Germany where migrants were tested on their beliefs regarding 
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issues such as sexuality.186 Such tests are designed to determine those suited for 
inclusion in the society and those who are considered unfitting of the standards of 
European society, mainly because Europe anticipates that they will not be able to 
conform or display loyalty to European values and ideals and because of the widespread 
association between Muslims and criminal activity. In response, European 
governments delegated certain tasks to security forces, making it the role of security 
forces to determine whether migrants were capable of integrating or not. Security forces 
then took the opportunity to begin monitoring these migrants. This took place in 
schools, universities, homes, public spaces, and elsewhere. The association established 
between Muslim migrants and criminal activity was often reported in the media, 
sometimes at the behest and with encouragement from security forces and other times 
through investigative journalists who infiltrated Muslim spaces such as mosques and, 
with no understanding of the Muslim faith, assumed that Muslims gathered for 
nefarious reasons. These reports often influenced the thoughts and beliefs of the general 
public towards Muslims and often resulted in raids by security forces against Muslims 
and Muslim spaces with little to no evidence of criminal activity. Not only that, but 
Muslim women in Europe are even told how they must dress to become a part of 
European society. 
Theoretically, it appears that the European Union wants to attempt to make migrants 
feel welcome and help them assimilate and become a part of European society. The 
approaches undertaken by the European Union in order to integrate migrants, such as 
the Common Basic Principles of Immigrant Integration Policy and the Action Plan on 
the Integration of Third Country Nationals include several points and actions that EU 
countries are meant to take to achieve successful integration of migrants.  However, in 
practice, EU countries are passing their own integration policies which may or may not 
include the policies included in the Common Basic Principles and the Action Plan, 
despite both being created to facilitate integration. As such it can often be the case that 
countries establish policies much harsher than what the European Commission had 
anticipated in both documents. This thesis outlines several problems that can be found 
in the European Union’s approach to integration and several problems in the national 
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policies for integration in different countries. National policies often neglected certain 
aspects from the Common Basic Principles of Immigrant Integration Policy such as the 
need to allow immigrants access to goods and services equal to that of natural citizens, 
and that their religious and cultural practices should be safeguarded. In fact, EU 
countries were participating in a crackdown against migrants, including Muslim 
migrants, under the guise of integration because they fear that migrants have brought 
in dangers that must be resolved before they manifest. This thesis does not aim to offer 
solutions to the issues of securitization or integration. However, it problematizes the 
European Union’s vision of migrant integration and the harmonious society envisioned 
by showing that while the EU approach to integration seems ideal it in fact neglects 
certain facts crucial to integration such as different levels of migrants and differences 
in national policies.  Because of this, it is no surprise that migrants experience very 
difficult measures to integrate, some more than others. The European Commission 
envisioned a uniform policy of integration, however, it also tasked countries with 
creating national policies for integration. As a result, some countries took advantage of 
this and created national policies for integration that disguised the agenda for 
securitization. Migrants who have managed to escape their countries due to conflicts, 
lack of opportunities, or even for the simple wish to survive have become the 
scapegoats for public disorders, terrorism, radicalization and other crimes Europe has 
associated with them. In its fight towards equality for all, Europe has managed to 
legitimize the isolation and exclusion as well as increase the securitization of a group 
of people who have little to no ways of fighting back. 
